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Abstract 
 
The rates of default and foreclosure have increased sharply due to the subprime 
mortgage meltdown back in late 2006.  To a certain extent, the crisis is related to the 
popularity of securitization that has increased the supply of credit, especially in areas in 
which rejections of mortgage application were prevalent before.  Many believe the 
notion that the crisis is mainly caused by a large increase of low-quality borrowers.  
Using a sample of foreclosed loans under securitization, our purpose is to provide a 
groundwork for determining whether the aforementioned notion can be substantiated 
through the use of actual data.  Specifically, if securitization is not the key to the crisis, a 
large number of rational default should exist.  Contrary to such idea, the statistical result 
from our dataset shows that a large number of defaults are caused by life-events, and 
therefore, providing grounds to believe that securitization is a likely suspect for the 
collapse of the housing market.   
 
 
 
Keywords: foreclosure, default barrier, rational default, negative equity, life-event, 
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1: Introduction 
 
Default, at the option of borrowers, can be triggered by two major reasons - life-events 
and depreciation of house prices1.  Life-event is relatively straight-forward, as events 
such as divorce, unemployment, death of loved ones can lead to an immediate shortage 
of cash, and thus ultimately lead to default.  The depreciation of house prices would 
need to be scrutinized.  For a person without much knowledge in mortgage, one may 
determine his/her default decision based on the house price relative to the outstanding 
loan balance, i.e. the loan-to-value ratios (LTV).  For instance, a LTV of higher than one 
would put a borrower at an advantageous position to exercise her option to default.  
However, this is a naïve decision rule as there is a possibility for the house price to 
appreciate during the remaining life of the term.  In fact, Jones (1995) stated that a loan 
must be considerably “under water” for a borrower to rationally default.  Foote, Gerardi 
and Willen (2008) further concluded the economic rationale that negative equity is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for foreclosure.   At any time before the 
termination or maturity of the loan, there exists a certain amount of time value (in 
addition to intrinsic value) to the borrower’s claim.   
 
Due to the put-like feature of the borrower’s behavior, Jones (1995) and Theunissen 
(2009) employed numerical methods to model the borrower’s default decision (i.e. the 
prepayment and rational default region).  A similar framework is also adopted in this 
paper, albeit the existence of other default types (positive equity default and life-event 
default) that we will be exploring as the paper unfolds.   
 
Traditionally, academics and practitioners (i.e. lenders) use a number of variables as 
indicators of default rate.  Demyanyk (2009) identified four major factors that seem to 
most affect the probability of default two years after origination: post-origination house 
price appreciation, FICO score, Combined LTV (CLTV2) and mortgage rate.  Due to the 
limitation of our dataset, we can only utilize the mortgage-specific LTV, estimated house 
price, and static FICO3 to analyze the default behavior of different groups of borrowers.   
                                                 
1
 In the paper “Reducing Foreclosures”, Foote et. al suggested that one of the important sources of 
default is the interaction of falling prices and adverse life events. 
2
 Combined LTV refers to aggregated loans (such as second mortgage, car loans, education loans etc).   
3
 FICO (Fair Isaac Corporation) is one of the most used credit score for measuring credit risk.  Static FICO 
refers to the FICO of the borrower as at the date of loan origination. 
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2: Overview of the US Mortgage Market  
 
The overall US mortgage market was an attractive pool from 2001 to 2005.  Figure 14 
shows the level of US house price (in terms of HPI) relative to three different measures – 
the CPI, rents and median family income.  As shown, HPI has an ongoing increase from 
1997 to 2006.  In a study of house prices between 2001 and 2005, Mian and Sufi (2008) 
suggests that securitization may have increased the supply of credit, especially in areas 
in which rejections of mortgage application were prevalent before.  The increase in 
supply of credit allowed for more home purchases and thus led to rapid increase in 
house prices.  Under such an increasing trend, bubble of the overall housing market 
comes into shape as borrowing was strongly encouraged in both the prime and sub-
prime market. 
 
 
Source: “Systemic Risk and the Financial Crisis: A Primer” – James Bullard, Christopher J. Neely, and David C. Wheelock 
(September 2009) 
 
For a typical borrower, ownership of a house takes precedence.  From the standpoint of 
a person who is looking for purchasing her first home, an upward move of house price 
                                                 
4
 The house price index (HPI) shown is the S&P/Case-Shiller National HPI; consumer price index (CPI) data 
exclude the shelter component; the rent index is a separate component of the CPI; median family income 
is an aggregated monthly series from the National Association of Realtors; and recession dates (vertical 
gray bars) are from the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
3 
 
would be unfavorable.  Furthermore, U.S. interest rate was at a relatively low level prior 
to 2006.  Therefore, when house prices are increasing, one would want to obtain a 
mortgage as soon as possible in order to lock in a reasonable price and rate.  However, it 
is such a lock-in of house price during the booming period that brings in losses to 
borrowers when the housing market collapses subsequently.  In general, the buy-side of 
the US housing market are mainly comprised of three groups of different intentions – 
those looking for a primary residence; those who purchase for long-term investments; 
and those who want to profit from speculation in the short-run.   
 
The sub-prime crisis caused by the declined house price crushed the financial market 
and job market.  Consequently, a lot of borrowers, regardless of their original intent, 
began to exit the market.  Figure 2 clearly shows that the sharp decline in house prices 
in late 2006 was followed by the dramatic increase in the number of foreclosure.   
 
 
Source: “Systemic Risk & the Financial Crisis: A Primer” – J. Bullard, Christopher J. Neely, & David C. Wheelock (Sep 09) 
 
Demyanyk (2009) defined the term “subprime” as (i) borrowers with a low credit score, 
history of delinquency or bankruptcy, or poor employment history; (ii) lenders 
specializing in high-cost loans and selling fewer loans to government-sponsored 
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enterprises; (iii) securities that encompass a subprime loan; and (iv) certain mortgage 
generally not available in the prime market.   Borrowers who have less capability to 
meet the debt obligations could borrow from subprime market.  Besides, many of these 
loans came in the form of adjustable-rate which offers a teaser rate in the first two or 
three years, after which the resetting mechanism kicks in and thus exposes borrowers to 
the risk of increasing interest rates.    
 
3: Exiting the Market 
 
With the assumption that lender always forecloses if the borrower defaults5, 
prepayment and foreclosure are the two ways borrowers can exit the market.  However, 
they are costly.  Some mortgage loans contain a prepayment penalty that requires 
borrowers to pay a certain amount should they choose to prepay in favorable 
conditions, one of which is when the market value of house price exceeds the 
outstanding loan balance.   
 
3.1: The Foreclosure Process and Cost 
 
Foreclosure is defined as the process through which the lender (or the contracted loan 
servicer) reclaims the property when the borrower defaults by means of consecutive 
non-payment (i.e. delinquencies and defaults).  When exactly foreclosure occurs 
depends on the specification of the loan contract.  As soon as the loan has entered the 
foreclosure process, it is governed by the foreclosure law that is dictated by the state in 
which the loan is originated.  Therefore, foreclosure law varies from state to state.  
However, in general, the foreclosure process is lengthy.  A typical foreclosure process, 
counting from the date the loan has entered the foreclosure process, takes about a 
year. 
 
The lengthy process produces a large cost shared by the lenders, servicers and 
borrowers.  According to a Financial Times article “America needs a way to stem 
foreclosure” (2008), Summers stated that a typical foreclosure runs at one-third or more 
of a home’s value.   
                                                 
5
 In other words, strategic default is ruled out here 
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For borrowers, the cost mainly comes in the form of worsened credit report, which 
affects their ability to rent or secure a future loan.  A few intangible impacts include 
changing lifestyle and lowered self-esteem.  These costs are offset by the benefit of 
“free rent” that is usually enjoyed by the borrowers during the lengthy foreclosure 
process.  As such, lenders and servicers bear the remaining bulk of foreclosure costs 
which include lost principal and interest payments, tax and insurance payments 
incurred, cost of maintaining (or in some cases restoring) the underlying property, legal 
costs and other administrative costs.   Due to the time-dependent nature of these costs, 
the longer the foreclosure process, the higher the cost will be.   
 
3.2: Factors Affecting Prepayment and Foreclosure 
 
Demyanyk (2009) summarized the largest impact on the probability of a borrower to 
prepay or refinance a loan.  Most foreclosures happened within the first two or three 
years of origination.  The main factors affecting the probability of prepayments and 
foreclosures are shown in the following table, with the highlighted ones being the most 
important. 
Factors Prepayment Foreclosure 
House price appreciation (pre-origination and post-origination) √  
The presence of prepayment penalties √  
The resetting structure of mortgage rates √  
CLTV (Combined Loan-to-Value ratio) √ √ 
FICO credit score  √ 
The mortgage rate  √ 
Post-origination house price appreciation √ √ 
 
4: Data 
 
Our data are obtained from the Wells Fargo’s CTSLink that collects loan-level data from 
pools of mortgage-backed securities issuers. The static information about individual 
loans such as FICO score at origination, purchase price, Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio at 
origination, city, state and zip code are collected.  The loan-level data also provides 
useful information about the loan’s current status, for e.g. the number of months 
delinquent and whether the loan has entered the foreclosure process.  The database 
contains information on over 330 mortgage-backed securities issuers.  Readers should 
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be reminded that, due to the limited scale of the sample, our dataset is unlikely to 
represent the whole US mortgage market, but instead represents only a small 
securitized portion of the particular states and period being studied.  
 
For estimation, our sample contains information on approximately 12,000 individual 
loans originated between 2006 Q2 and 2007 Q2, and followed through 2010 Q2.  The 
data set is limited to 30-year adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) issued by three private-
labels including Citigroup, Morgan Stanley ABS Capital Inc., and Merrill Lynch Mortgage 
Loans Inc.  For the purpose of our report, we are only interested in loans that have 
entered the foreclosure process.   
 
Among all the country-wide loans, we further limited our scope to the states that 
contain the highest proportion of negative and near-negative equity (“negative share”).  
Arizona, California, Florida, and Nevada are the four states with a significant proportion 
of negative share (see appendix 1).  By focusing on the major cities of these four states, 
the sample was narrowed to contain 412 individual foreclosed loans.  For each loan, we 
applied the respective city HPI6 to estimate the house price at the quarter of 
foreclosure.  Using the estimated house price and the already-known outstanding debt, 
the LTV at the foreclosure quarter can be calculated with ease.  
 
Based on our sample, the mean and standard deviation of the FICO at origination are 
620.59 and 57.35, respectively (see appendix 2).  In the study of mortgage 
“affordability” by Foote, Gerardi, Goette and Willen (2009), their sampled data has a 
FICO mean of 714.1 for prime market and 609.0 for sub-prime market based on the 
loans originated from 2005-2008 (see appendix 3). Therefore, we can reasonably 
conclude that most of the loans in our sample are more weighted to the sub-prime 
market side.  
  
                                                 
6
 The HPI (House Price Index) is a broad measure of the movement of single-family house prices.  It is a 
weighted, repeat-sales index, i.e. a measure of average price changes in repeat sales or refinancing on the 
same properties. 
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5: Modelling the Borrower’s Optimal Behavior 
 
To determine the borrower’s optimal behavior along the loan horizon, it is best to start 
off by introducing some notations.  The borrower’s loan can be represented by the 
following equation: 
 

1 p ecd b(t)ect
0
t
  
 
, where 1 represents the total amount of loan, p is the yearly rate of payment flow over 
the time horizon [0,T], and c is the contractual loan rate. 
 
The loan contract confers the right, but not the obligation, to the lender to foreclose the 
property should the borrower be delinquent or offers a rate of p* that is less than p at 
maturity.  The lender will have to incur the foreclosure cost if he chooses to foreclose.  
Since our emphasis of this paper is on the borrower’s behavior, the lender’s behavior 
will not be examined. 
  
In general, a borrower defaults (and thus leading to foreclosure) when one of the 
following occurs: (i) a life-event that leads to shortage of cash to make up the 
contractual loan payment.  For the purpose of this paper, we define this type as “life-
event default”; (ii) the house price declines to a level that is much lower than the 
outstanding loan balance.  As such, the probability of recovery is remote.  In this case, it 
would be rational for the borrower to “put” back the loan to the lender.  We define this 
as “rational default”. 
 
At any point in time, by ruling out the option of loan renegotiation, the rational default 
decision is mainly driven by the fluctuation of house price, which is assumed to follow a 
stochastic process.  As long as the loan is alive, the property generates a continuous 
flow of housing services, dh(t) favoring the borrowers.  Taking the housing service flow 
into account, the stochastic process of the house price can be represented by the 
following equation: 
 

dh(t) (rh(t)d(h,t))dt h(t)d  ˜z(t) 
 
where r is the constant instantaneous rate, and 

˜ z(t)  is a standard Brownian motion. 
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To expand our analysis of the borrower’s optimal strategy before time T, we have to 
introduce a new level of debt service flow, 

p  ≤ p.  At this level, the borrower is 
indifferent between servicing the loan or defaulting.  Therefore, default and thus 
foreclosure occur when the borrower offers a debt service flow at p* <

p .  Logically, we 
refer to

p  as the default barrier along the loan horizon.  By the same token, there also 
exists a prepayment barrier p .  However, our analysis will not be covering the 
prepayment side due to the sharp decline of the general housing market in the period 
covered. 
 
Based on the sample of data we obtained, we model the typical mortgage as a short-
term 3-year loan.  Due to its short-term nature, the modeled mortgage can also be 
assumed to be fixed-rate.  In this 3-year term loan, we have to embrace all possible 
states of the borrower.  We do this by setting up a state space H x T, where H ≡ [0,∞) 
represents the vertical scope for which the house price h can take on at any given time.  
Likewise, T ≡ [0,T] denotes the 3-year term horizon.   
 
5.1: Borrower’s Value 
 
In the state space of H x T, borrowers make decisions that maximize their own payoff.  
In our simple framework, borrowers either continue to service their debt or default, 
whichever maximizes the value of their own position (again prepayment is out of 
consideration given the declining nature of house price in the period covered).  A subset 
D is contained inside the H x T grid.  We refer to it as the default region, where 
borrowers would default should their states fall within it.  To make this a feasible model, 
we assume that borrowers can continuously observe the value of h.  In short, the loan is 
terminated when it falls within the default region or when it reaches the maturity T.   
 
5.2: Value to Borrower 
 
In the H x T grid, there exists two types of values to the borrower – the continuation 
value and the termination value, represented by B(h,t) and ΩB(h,t), respectively.  From 
the arbitrage/replication argument of the option pricing theory, it can be shown that B 
satisfies the following differential equation in the open region: 
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
1
2
2h2Bhh [rh d]Bh Bt  d  p*  rB  
 
Together with the proper specifications of the boundary conditions, we can solve for the 
borrower’s (and lender’s) optimal policies.  Theunissen (2008) and Dixit (1993) provide 
more details for the boundary conditions.   
 
5.3: Borrower’s Strategies 
 
Recall that the lender is conferred the right to foreclose should the borrower makes an 
offer at p* < p.  For securitized mortgage, we make a solid assumption that the servicer 
is obligated to foreclose for any offer at p* < p at or any time before maturity. 
 
i. Strategies at Maturity 
 
At the maturity of the loan, depending on the relative house price h(T) and outstanding 
loan balance P, the borrower makes his/her rational offer as follows: 
 
P
*
 = 0  for  h(T) ≤ P 
 
P
*
 = P  for  h(T) > P 
 
Accordingly, the lender’s and borrower’s values can be represented by: 
 

L(h,T) 
max0,h(T)  l(h,T)  if h(T)  P
P if h(T)  P



B(h,T) max0,h(T) P 
 
 
ii. Strategies prior to Maturity 
 
Recall the obligated foreclosure assumption we made earlier, default and thus 
foreclosure occur whenever the offer p* < p is made by the borrower.  Therefore, along 
the border of the subset D, the borrower’s continuation value B(h,T) is driven to be nil, 
same as the termination value ΩB(h,t).  Consequently, the termination value of both the 
lender and borrower can be represented by: 
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ΩL(h,t) = max{0,h(t) – l(h,t)}
7
 
 
 ΩB(h,t) = 0  
 
The default barrier (or subset D) defines the severity of the LTV ratio that encourages 
the borrower to put the loan back to the lender.  Therefore, the borrower’s default 
decision (i.e. optimal policies) tracing back from T to the loan initiation period is 
comparable to an American put option.  Let 

h(t)  be the house price that makes the LTV 
fall on the default barrier.  For 

h(t)  < h(t) < b(t)8, the borrower would incur a negative 
equity and thus the resulting intrinsic value is zero.  However, in this “sandwiched” 
section, instead of defaulting, the borrower would wait for recovery of the house in the 
hope of future positive equity.  Therefore, the time value would be positive.    
 
To complete the picture of our analysis, there also exists an upper termination barrier 
(or prepayment barrier) 

D , where the borrower would terminate the loan by 
prepayment should the loan falls into this subset.  Similarly, let 

h (t)  be the house price 
that makes the LTV fall on the prepayment barrier.  Again, such region will not be 
elaborated on this paper due to the declining nature of the house price in the period 
covered. 
 
Figure 2 provides a quick snapshot of the time grid H x T.  The three regions can be 
defined by the following ranges: 
 
Symbol Region Range Decision 

D  Prepayment region (not covered) h(t) > 

h (t)  Prepayment 
C Continuation region 

h(t)  < h(t) < b(t) Debt Servicing 
D Default region h(t) < 

h(t)  Default/Foreclosure 
 
                                                 
7
  l represents the foreclosure cost which is assumed to bear a linear relationship (see appendix 6) 
8
  b(t) denotes the outstanding loan balance 
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Figure 2: Strategy space for securitized mortgages 
 
6: Theoretical Results and Interpretations 
 
Recall the three groups being analyzed are rational default, life-event default and 
positive equity default. 
 
Figure 3 displays the theoretical defaullt barrier model based on a set of inputs including 
the risk-free rate, housing service flow, contractual loan rate, payment flow rate, loan 
term, foreclosure cost, etc.  
 
Our dataset contains an average duration of 2.63 years.  Somewhat, this conincides with 
the study by Demyanyk (2009) who found that 80% of the subprime loans originated in 
2006 and 2007  defaulted within three years after origination. 
(Appendix 6 shows how the other inputs for the default barrier model were obtained, for 
e.g. contractual interest rate, housing service flow, volatility). 
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* denotes default status 
Figure 3: Securitized mortgage: Borrower’s strategies 
 
Based on the result, for time t ≥ 1.2 (time to maturity), the default barrier is modeled to 
be 0.70, which is the house price relative to the outstanding loan.  Similarly, for t < 1.2, 
the default barrier is modeled to be 0.80.  By converting the y-axis of the grid to loan-to-
value ratio (by taking the reciprocals), we obtain the following conclusion: 
 

LTV 1Positive Equity Foreclosure
LTV 1Negative Equity Foreclosure
t 1.2
LTV 1.25  RationalForeclosure
1 LTV 1.25  Life  Event Foreclosure



t 1.2
LTV 1.43  RationalForeclosure
1 LTV 1.43  Life  Event Foreclosure

















 
 
Theoretically, positive equity foreclosure should not exist as it is deemed irrational to do 
so.  If the market is efficient, even borrowers with low credit scores should be able to 
refinance their loans as long as the loans have positive equity.  
 
For life-event foreclosure, the borrower is more likely to encounter life events such as 
loss of employment and divorce that lead to shortage of cash.  To a certain extent, the 
FICO score can be used by the lender as an indication of the probability of default.  
Historically, borrowers with FICO scores below 620 (“low FICO”) have a much higer 
default rate than those with FICO scores above 700 (“high FICO”).  Besides, low FICO 
borrowers tend to have a lower capability to meet the debit obligation.  Therefore, in 
this default group, we would expect to see more low-credit (i.e. low FICO) foreclosure.  
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LTV increases as the house price continues to drop.  When the LTV is excessively high, 
i.e. when the borrower is way underwater, it would be rational (theoretically under all 
circumstances) for him to default and put the loan back to the lender.  As a result, FICO 
should be a irrelevant variable in this group. 
 
As mentioned earlier, securization may have increased the supply of credit, i.e. granting 
the ability to more low-quality borrowers to enter the mortgage market.  Theoretically, 
if securitization is a major cause of the housing market crisis, we would expect to see a 
dominating number of life-event defaults.  This is because, by intuition, life-events are 
considered to have a more profound impact to the low-quality (low-FICO) borrowers.  
On the other hand, if there exists a large number of rational defaults, one may suggest 
that securitization is not a critical factor of the crisis based on the idea that high-quality 
borrowers are considered to have the ability to persist longer even in the presence of 
life-events and economic hardships. 
7: Analytical Results 
 
We want to compare the number of default/foreclosure between low FICO and high 
FICO borrowers for the three groups – positive equity foreclosure, life-event foreclosure 
and rational foreclosure. The statistical result is summarized below. 
 
 
 
Out of the 412 loans, 94 belong to the positive equity group.  The lack of high FICO 
foreclosure in this group indicates that life-event is potentially the cause of default.  In 
our opinion, there are several likely causes of positive equity default.  Firstly, the reset 
mechanism of the adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM), to a certain extent, catalyses 
homeowners towards deliquency.  This reason can be substantiated by the paper 
written by Christopher L. Cagan (2006), who studied the sensitivity of reset on the 
number of foreclosures for ARMs originated from 2004 to 2006.  Secondly, in general, 
the latest appraised value of a property does not necessarily equate to its actual current 
14 
 
market value.  For e.g., the last appraisal was performed six months ago, and that a 
negative economic shock can adversely impact the house price in the mean time.   In 
fact, this is consistent with the view that banks may be reluctant to write down further 
(by reassessing the house value) in the hope of disposing the property at a more 
favorable price.  Thirdly, there may be a natural tendancy for banks to move faster to 
foreclosure in homes that have positive equity.  In our dataset, Miami contains the most 
positive equity default (50 out of 94).    
 
Another way to explain the existence of positive equity default is more applicable to a 
specific subset of the pool – loans with outstanding balances that are marginally less 
than the nominal value of the house, for e.g. a LTV of 0.95.  Borrowers have to pay for 
closing costs, such as lawyer’s fees and commissions when they are to sell the house.  
On top of that, the advertised price would have to be discounted if the borrowers want 
to complete the deal as soon as possible.  After taking into account all of these closing 
costs, the borrower may no longer be classified as a positive equity status and thus it 
may be more beneficial for them (especially for those who do not worry much about 
further deterioration of credit quality) to simply default on the loan.  Using the range 
between 0.95 and 1.0 for the LTV as our definition of “marginally positive equity”, we 
found that there are 22 out of 412 loans (equivalent to 5%) that fall into this category.  
Based on such logic, we tried using 0.90 in lieu of 1.0 as the border of positive equity.  
The result turns out that there are only 65 defaults, a significant drop of almost thirty 
cases.   
 
In the life-event default group, there exists more low FICO borrowers.  During the period 
from which the samples are taken, house prices decline drastically.  The adverse impact 
to the financial market brought by subprime mortgage crisis had also crushed the job 
market.  As a result, many borrowers bore their losses from their financial investments 
and job layoffs.  In turn, these losses highly affect their cash flow and thus the ability to 
meet the mortgage payments.  By intuition, it is the low-FICO group that absorbs a 
bigger piece of these losses.   Therefore, relative to to high-FICO borrowers who tend to 
have a more stable cash flow, a larger proportion of low-FICO foreclosure is plausible. 
 
Finally for rational foreclosure, the number of foreclosure units is lower than what we 
expected.  This is attributable to the fact that some borrowers may not be able to 
persist long enough to reach the default barrier (life-events and decreasing time to 
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maturity can lower the “tolerance level” of borrowers).  Secondly, since default can 
adversely affect the borrower’s creditability for future house purchase, rental and 
insurance, those with a sound capital base and stable cash flow may choose to continue 
to service the debt rather than default.  
 
Apparently, with 2/3 of the total defaults falling in the life-event group and only 44 in 
the rational default group, we suggest that securitizatoin is one of the major causes of 
the subprime market crisis.   
 
8: Hypothesis Testing 
 
So far in the development of our paper, besides LTV, FICO was used as the variable for 
analyzing default decision.  However, one may question the actual practicality of FICO 
when foreclosure is classified into the three groups.   Furthermore, as mentioned, FICO 
may not be a relevant variable when LTV breaches the default barrier, i.e. if it is a 
rational default.  As a way to confirm this, we formulated a null and alternative 
hypothesis about the equality of two sample means, one being the mean of the rational 
default group, and the other of the other extreme case, i.e. the mean of the positive 
equity group.   
 
In order to apply such hypothesis testing, we have to be reasonably certain that the 
samples are independent and normally distributed.  Instead of performing statistical 
testing, we simply make an assumption here that the samples are independent.   
 
For the setup of the hypothesis testing, we divided the samples into two groups.  The 
first group is comprised of loans with LTV that breaches the default barrier (i.e. either 
larger than 1.25 or 1.43, depending on the duration of the loan).  We defined this group 
as “Rational Default”.  The second group consists of loans with LTV < 1, and thus is 
termed “Positive Equity”.   
 
In order to test for normality, which is one of the requirements for applying the 
hypothesis testing of sample means, we employed the Anderson-Darling test, which is 
commonly used to detect departure from normality.  The detail of the test is explained 
in appendix 4.  The samples in the rational default group yield a statistical number that 
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is less than the critical value of 0.751 at 5% significance level.  Therefore, we can 
reasonably assume that the samples in this group are normally distributed.  On the 
other hand, the samples in the positive default group yield a statistical number that is 
larger than the same critical value, thus preventing us from concluding that the samples 
are normally distributed.  Despite such contradictory result, we believe that a different 
testing conclusion will be produced by having a larger sample size.   
 
Since the objective is to test for the equality of the two sample means.  The null and 
alternative hypotheses are set up as follow: 
 
Ho:  μr = μp  or  μr – μp = 0 
 
Ha:  μr ≠ μp  or  μr – μp ≠ 0 
 
, where μr and μp represent the FICO means of the rational default group and positive 
equity group, respectively. 
 
Rejecting the null hypothesis means that the FICO means of the two groups are 
significantly different, and thus FICO is not a relevant variable for explaining the default 
behavior. 
 
The t-statistic can be computed by the following equation: 
 

t  stat 
p  r
 p
2
np

 r
2
nr
 
 
Whereas the degrees of freedom (DOF) for determining the critical value can be 
computed as follows: 
 

DOF 
p
2
np

r
2
nr






2
p
2
np






2
np

r
2
nr






2
nr
 
 
The detail of the hypothesis test is contained in appendix 5.   The calculated t-statistic is 
approximately 2.85, which is greater than the t-critical value of 2.0 at 5% significance 
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level.  Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that FICO is not a relevant 
variable for explaining defaults in the two groups. 
9: Conclusion 
 
Applying to our dataset, the default barrier model shows that optimal/rational default 
occurs when borrowers are well underwater, i.e. with LTV significantly larger than one.  
In fact, our model also shows that such barrier varies slightly across time due to the 
changing intrinsic value and time value across the loan horizon.   
 
One step further into the analysis of the foreclosed loans, a large number of positive 
equity default was discovered.  Among other possibilities, a few rationales were came 
up to explain such abnormality – the resetting mechanism of ARM, the potential 
inequality between the observed value and true value of housing, and the natural 
tendency for banks to foreclose on loans with positive equity, as well as the inclusion of 
closing costs that may turn borrowers into being the negative equity status.   
 
Our statistical result clearly shows that the number of life-event defaults is way over the 
number of rational defaults (274 vs. 44). To sharpen the key point, low-quality 
borrowers are more sensitive to life-events leading to immediate cash shortages more 
than they do to depreciation of house prices.  Therefore, we suggest that securitization 
that increased the supply of credit, particularly to the low-quality borrowers, is a major 
cause that of the subprime market crisis.   
 
While default barrier is a theoretical way for determining the optimal point to exercise 
the default option, most borrowers from our sample are unable to endure the period of 
negative equity.  This can be attributable to the adverse economic impact brought by 
the subprime market meltdown.  In turn, a massive wave of life-events was followed by, 
and thus reducing the tolerance level of borrowers in terms of LTV.  On the other end of 
the spectrum, the dataset contains some LTV that are significantly higher than the 
default barrier LTV, thus suggesting that these borrowers may have good cash flow 
standing that encourages them to persist a bit longer. 
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10: Leeway for Future Improvement 
 
Our paper came up with some plausible reasons as an attempt to explain some of the 
anomalies, such as the significant number of positive equity default and less-than-
expected number of rational default, as observed from our statistical result.  However, 
these results are likely to contain unintentional biases caused by input errors or 
representativeness of the dataset.  For improvement on future research on a similar 
topic, employing the combined LTV (CLTV, as opposed to mortgage-specific LTV), as well 
as tracking the FICO scores would contribute to the analysis of the borrower behavior.  
The term “default” can be further defined in a narrower scope.  For instance, any loans 
(foreclosed or not) with a delinquency status of at least 270 days would be deemed to 
have defaulted.  In our dataset, the average number of months delinquent is a 
staggering high of 18.  Therefore, among the other “continuing” loans, it is likely that 
those have been delinquent for 270 days or more will end up defaulting and thus be in 
the foreclosure process.  Furthermore, adding the debt-to-income ratio (DTI)9 can help 
better analyze the actual cash flow of the borrowers.   Not to mention increasing the 
sample size in order to enhance the overall representativeness of the result. 
                                                 
9
  DTI is the ratio of mortgage-related payments (i.e. excluding other debts) to the borrower’s income 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Negative Equity by States (Q4 2009) 
 
 
Source: First American CoreLogic (http://www.facorelogic.com) 
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Appendix 2: Summary Statistics from Sample 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Summary Statistics: Loan Originated from 2005-2008 
 
 
Source: “Reducing Foreclosures” – Christopher L.Foote, Kristopher S.Gerardi, Lorenz Goette, and Paul S.Willen (April 
2009) 
Mean Std Dev
FICO Score 620.59 57.35
LTV Ratio 78.82 14.13
Number of Loans 412
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
DTI Ratio 35.1 13.8 40.0 11.1
FICO Ratio 714.1 61.6 609.0 54.9
LTV Ratio 73.4 18.2 79.2 12.5
Adjustable Rate Dummy 0.21 0.40 0.56 0.50
Number of Loans
Prime Subprime
501,317 41,132
21 
 
Appendix 4: Testing for Normality – Anderson-Darling Test 
 
Steps (for the two groups: Rational Default and Positive Equity) 
1) Sort the data Xi = 1, 2, …., n  
 
2) Calculate the mean and standard deviation  
 
3) Standardize Xi to make Yi 
 
4) Calculate the “A-statistics” A2 using the equation: 
 

A2  n 
1
n
(2i 1)(ln(Yi) ln(1
i1
n
 (Yn1i)))  
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Loans Rational Default Yi = (Xi - mu)/s A = (2i - 1) B= ln(phi(Yi)) C = ln(1 - phi(Yn+1-1)) A * (B+C)
1 466 -2.58304356 1 5.319-             -5.167931866 10.49-         
2 498 -2.068481402 3 3.948-             -4.015732607 23.89-         
3 510 -1.875520593 5 3.495-             -2.708452925 31.02-         
4 547 -1.280558098 7 2.301-             -2.378570335 32.76-         
5 561 -1.055437154 9 1.927-             -2.293157159 37.98-         
6 566 -0.975036816 11 1.803-             -1.894848672 40.68-         
7 567 -0.958956749 13 1.779-             -1.543348274 43.19-         
8 567 -0.958956749 15 1.779-             -1.499927835 49.19-         
9 572 -0.878556412 17 1.662-             -1.41547356 52.31-         
10 594 -0.524794928 19 1.204-             -1.314332135 47.86-         
11 597 -0.476554726 21 1.149-             -1.275237068 50.92-         
12 600 -0.428314524 23 1.096-             -1.144437427 51.53-         
13 607 -0.315754051 25 0.978-             -1.12650904 52.61-         
14 607 -0.315754051 27 0.978-             -1.056661223 54.93-         
15 607 -0.315754051 29 0.978-             -1.039662156 58.51-         
16 609 -0.283593917 31 0.946-             -1.022846801 61.03-         
17 612 -0.235353714 33 0.899-             -0.973495626 61.79-         
18 614 -0.203193579 35 0.869-             -0.941499746 63.36-         
19 615 -0.187113512 37 0.854-             -0.820620865 61.95-         
20 620 -0.106713175 39 0.782-             -0.806297034 61.94-         
21 621 -0.090633107 41 0.768-             -0.723934528 61.17-         
22 623 -0.058472972 43 0.741-             -0.685015902 61.31-         
23 626 -0.01023277 45 0.701-             -0.647573508 60.70-         
24 629 0.038007432 47 0.663-             -0.623419762 60.47-         
25 635 0.134487837 49 0.592-             -0.611582429 58.95-         
26 636 0.150567904 51 0.580-             -0.554752811 57.88-         
27 644 0.279208444 53 0.494-             -0.543851465 55.03-         
28 646 0.311368579 55 0.474-             -0.522505407 54.83-         
29 649 0.359608781 57 0.446-             -0.491612712 53.42-         
30 650 0.375688848 59 0.436-             -0.471756522 53.58-         
31 651 0.391768916 61 0.427-             -0.471756522 54.83-         
32 655 0.456089185 63 0.392-             -0.471756522 54.40-         
33 656 0.472169253 65 0.383-             -0.406782585 51.36-         
34 663 0.584729725 67 0.328-             -0.381025622 47.48-         
35 665 0.61688986 69 0.313-             -0.356479076 46.18-         
36 670 0.697290197 71 0.278-             -0.210499968 34.69-         
37 674 0.761610467 73 0.253-             -0.18487313 31.93-         
38 676 0.793770602 75 0.240-             -0.18487313 31.89-         
39 691 1.034971613 77 0.163-             -0.180049339 26.41-         
40 706 1.276172625 79 0.106-             -0.157370697 20.84-         
41 709 1.324412827 81 0.097-             -0.105554382 16.43-         
42 720 1.501293569 83 0.069-             -0.030830998 8.28-           
43 757 2.096256064 85 0.018-             -0.019486014 3.20-           
44 784 2.530417885 87 0.006-             -0.004908676 0.92-           
44
S = sum of G / n 44.41-         
Org Mean 626.6363636
Std Dev 62.18879392 -n - s 0.41           
critical value at 5% 0.751
Reject? No Reject
note: we are 
rejecting normality
thus, we don't
want rejection
Group I: Rational Default
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Loans Positive Equity Yi = (Xi - mu)/s A = (2i - 1) B= ln(phi(Yi)) C = ln(1 - phi(Yn+1-1)) A * (B+C)
1 492 -2.605481519 1 -5.384472134 -2.846074143 -8.23054628
2 501 -2.411719444 3 -4.835999832 -2.718719884 -22.6641591
3 506 -2.304073847 5 -4.546029084 -2.554432336 -35.5023071
4 509 -2.239486488 7 -4.37706777 -2.554432336 -48.5205007
5 515 -2.110311772 9 -4.050380014 -2.514340199 -59.0824819
6 517 -2.067253533 11 -3.944797513 -2.474638215 -70.613793
7 519 -2.024195294 13 -3.840864377 -2.43532549 -81.5904683
8 526 -1.873491458 15 -3.490019559 -2.134725052 -84.3711692
9 540 -1.572083786 17 -2.847906227 -1.959250056 -81.7216568
10 542 -1.529025547 19 -2.762574149 -1.858476441 -87.7999612
11 542 -1.529025547 21 -2.762574149 -1.761049243 -94.9960912
12 545 -1.464438188 23 -2.637538661 -1.761049243 -101.167522
13 559 -1.163030516 25 -2.100390971 -1.761049243 -96.5360053
14 562 -1.098443158 27 -1.995059859 -1.729311675 -100.558031
15 569 -0.947739322 29 -1.762407938 -1.697941173 -100.350124
16 569 -0.947739322 31 -1.762407938 -1.666936501 -106.309678
17 573 -0.861622844 33 -1.637592828 -1.666936501 -109.049468
18 574 -0.840093725 35 -1.607300602 -1.636296405 -113.525895
19 575 -0.818564605 37 -1.577370444 -1.636296405 -118.905673
20 582 -0.667860769 39 -1.377884877 -1.606019612 -116.372275
21 586 -0.581744291 41 -1.271647022 -1.546550754 -115.546109
22 586 -0.581744291 43 -1.271647022 -1.517356051 -119.927132
23 590 -0.495627814 45 -1.170929746 -1.460039358 -118.39361
24 591 -0.474098694 47 -1.146601264 -1.431914613 -121.190246
25 592 -0.452569575 49 -1.122609874 -1.431914613 -125.1717
26 594 -0.409511336 51 -1.075631702 -1.431914613 -127.884862
27 594 -0.409511336 53 -1.075631702 -1.404143735 -131.428098
28 598 -0.323394858 55 -0.98564587 -1.376725295 -129.930414
29 598 -0.323394858 57 -0.98564587 -1.376725295 -134.655156
30 600 -0.280336619 59 -0.942609992 -1.349657849 -135.243803
31 601 -0.2588075 61 -0.921574955 -1.322939927 -136.915408
32 601 -0.2588075 63 -0.921574955 -1.296570042 -139.743135
33 601 -0.2588075 65 -0.921574955 -1.296570042 -144.179425
34 602 -0.23727838 67 -0.900859369 -1.270546684 -145.484206
35 603 -0.215749261 69 -0.880461339 -1.270546684 -148.419554
36 606 -0.151161902 71 -0.821153292 -1.270546684 -148.510698
37 607 -0.129632783 73 -0.80200607 -1.270546684 -151.296351
38 608 -0.108103664 75 -0.783166573 -1.244868324 -152.102617
39 608 -0.108103664 77 -0.783166573 -1.21953341 -154.207899
40 609 -0.086574544 79 -0.764632763 -1.194540368 -154.774677
41 609 -0.086574544 81 -0.764632763 -1.074646645 -148.981632
42 610 -0.065045425 83 -0.746402574 -1.051670567 -149.240071
43 615 0.042600173 85 -0.659731997 -1.006707373 -141.647346
44 615 0.042600173 87 -0.659731997 -0.963050997 -141.18212
45 616 0.064129292 89 -0.643278815 -0.85953135 -133.750105
46 616 0.064129292 91 -0.643278815 -0.820332221 -133.188604
47 617 0.085658411 93 -0.627114118 -0.782371688 -131.08218
48 618 0.107187531 95 -0.611235642 -0.763850839 -130.633216
49 620 0.15024577 97 -0.580328194 -0.745633525 -128.618287
50 622 0.193304009 99 -0.550537893 -0.745633525 -128.32097
51 627 0.300949606 101 -0.4808243 -0.727717655 -122.062737
52 629 0.344007845 103 -0.454792221 -0.727717655 -121.798517
53 631 0.387066084 105 -0.429789015 -0.642585095 -112.599281
54 632 0.408595203 107 -0.417666811 -0.626432623 -111.718639
55 637 0.5162408 109 -0.360744813 -0.626432623 -107.602341
56 638 0.53776992 111 -0.350079528 -0.610566277 -106.631684
57 639 0.559299039 113 -0.339647629 -0.610566277 -107.374171
58 640 0.580828159 115 -0.329446368 -0.594983771 -106.309466
59 640 0.580828159 117 -0.329446368 -0.579682792 -106.368112
60 640 0.580828159 119 -0.329446368 -0.535445556 -102.922139
Group II: Positive Equity Default
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61 640 0.580828159 121 -0.329446368 -0.5212471 -102.93391
62 641 0.602357278 123 -0.319472985 -0.507318258 -101.695323
63 641 0.602357278 125 -0.319472985 -0.507318258 -103.348905
64 642 0.623886397 127 -0.309724699 -0.507318258 -103.764455
65 643 0.645415517 129 -0.300198713 -0.493656575 -102.407332
66 644 0.666944636 131 -0.290892218 -0.467124756 -99.3002236
67 644 0.666944636 133 -0.290892218 -0.467124756 -100.816258
68 645 0.688473756 135 -0.281802386 -0.417156524 -94.3594529
69 646 0.710002875 137 -0.272926377 -0.417156524 -94.5413575
70 646 0.710002875 139 -0.272926377 -0.393678873 -92.6581298
71 646 0.710002875 141 -0.272926377 -0.382307475 -92.3879732
72 647 0.731531995 143 -0.264261338 -0.371177475 -90.8677502
73 649 0.774590234 145 -0.247552689 -0.329017347 -83.6026552
74 650 0.796119353 147 -0.239503312 -0.329017347 -83.5725368
75 652 0.839177592 149 -0.223999955 -0.290501023 -76.6606458
76 653 0.860706711 151 -0.216540149 -0.23132371 -67.6274428
77 653 0.860706711 153 -0.216540149 -0.223678593 -67.3534676
78 654 0.882235831 155 -0.209271027 -0.216226961 -65.9521882
79 654 0.882235831 157 -0.209271027 -0.188296679 -62.4181298
80 655 0.90376495 159 -0.202189657 -0.188296679 -62.0873274
81 656 0.92529407 161 -0.195293102 -0.146188891 -54.9786009
82 657 0.946823189 163 -0.18857842 -0.130574125 -52.0218648
83 657 0.946823189 165 -0.18857842 -0.074224888 -43.3625459
84 657 0.946823189 167 -0.18857842 -0.065209739 -42.3826226
85 660 1.011410547 169 -0.16949614 -0.065209739 -39.6652936
86 663 1.075997906 171 -0.151944561 -0.059713445 -36.1935191
87 668 1.183643503 173 -0.125877451 -0.030975089 -27.1354894
88 676 1.355876459 175 -0.091643075 -0.021708975 -19.8366087
89 677 1.377405578 177 -0.087950121 -0.019544898 -19.0266184
90 678 1.398934697 179 -0.084378065 -0.017569194 -18.2485593
91 679 1.420463817 181 -0.080924139 -0.012641711 -16.9354188
92 679 1.420463817 183 -0.080924139 -0.010665929 -16.7609824
93 683 1.506580295 185 -0.06823509 -0.007970427 -14.0980205
94 686 1.571167653 187 -0.059826287 -0.004597815 -12.0473071
94
Mean 613.0212766 S = sum of O / n -95.8080153
Std Dev 46.4487181
-n - s 1.80801533
critical value at 5% 0.751
Reject? Reject
note: we are 
rejecting normality
thus, we don't
want rejection
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Appendix 5: Hypothesis Testing 
 
Objective: Investigate whether the mean FICO differ in the two LTV groups 
 

p : Positive Equity Foreclosure............LTV 1
r : RationalForeclosure...
LTV 1.25 if t 1.2
LTV 1.43 if t 1.2








 
 
Null and Alternative Hypotheses: 

H0 : p r  0
Ha : p r  0
 
 
Decision Rule: Rejection means that the distributions of the two groups are significantly 
different. Thus FICO is not a relevant variable for foreclosures. 
 
The summarized statistics of data are shown below, while the raw data and the 
distributions are shown in the next page.  
 
 Positive Equity Rational Default 
Mean       610.00         640.00  
Std Dev         46.45           62.19  
Sample Size 94 44 
 
Test-Statistics: T-test (justified by the number of samples used >30) 
 
Test Requirement:  
(i) Samples are independent (assumed in this case)            
(ii) Samples are normal distributed (confirmed by Anderson-Darling test – see 
appendix 6) 
 
Significant Level: 5% 
 
Solution Table: 
 t-value for our test Critical t-value (absolute) 
t-stat -2.8494 2 
Reject/Fail to Reject Reject 
 
Conclusion: Therefore, we REJECT the null hypothesis and conclude that the FICO 
distributions of the two groups are NOT significantly different.  
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Data for Hypotheses testing 
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Appendix 6: Inputs (contractual interest rate, housing service flow, foreclosure 
cost and volatility) 
 
Contractual Interest Rate, c: 
 
 
Source: National average contract mortgage rate (http://www.fhfa.gov) 
 
Housing Service Flow, d: 
 
Source: “Rent-Price Ratio” (http://www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/land-values/rent-price-ratio.asp) 
 
Rent-to-price ratio is calculated by dividing the estimated average national rents by the 
house price based on the Case-Shiller House Price Index 
 
 
Foreclosure Cost, f 
We assume that the foreclosure cost follows a linear relationship as follows: 
 

f (h,t)  f0  f1h(t)  
 
For illustration purpose, f0 and f1 are set to be 0.10 and 0.15, respectively.
Contract Interest Effective Interest
Date Rate (%) Rate (%)
July 2006 6.53 6.58
August 2006 6.66 6.70
September 2006 6.30 6.37
October 2006 6.30 6.36
November 2006 6.31 6.37
December 2006 6.29 6.35
January 2007 6.25 6.31
February 2007 6.27 6.35
March 2007 6.15 6.22
April 2007 6.10 6.16
May 2007 6.17 6.24
June 2007 6.35 6.42
Average 6.31
Date Average annual rent (imputed) Average house price rent-price ratio
Q4 2006 $9,643.69 $297,692.65 3.24%
Q1 2007 $9,755.61 $295,121.93 3.31%
Q2 2007 $9,844.34 $292,471.37 3.37%
Q3 2007 $9,924.76 $287,425.73 3.45%
Q4 2007 $10,030.23 $272,640.10 3.68%
Average 3.41%
Case-Shiller after 2000
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Volatility, σ, of house price from December 2006 to December 2009 
 
 
 
Source: S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices (http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/sp-case-shiller-home-price-
indices)  
 
Date AZ-Phoenix CA-Los Angeles FL-Miami NV-Las Vegas Composite-20
 PHXR LXXR MIXR LVXR SPCS20R
December 2006 221.50 270.03 280.87 231.57 203.33
January 2007 220.20 268.68 279.42 230.52 202.31
February 2007 218.07 266.63 279.43 229.64 201.57
March 2007 216.86 264.58 276.89 228.55 201.01
April 2007 215.04 263.37 273.53 226.65 200.54
May 2007 213.94 263.19 269.52 224.79 200.12
June 2007 212.52 262.12 264.89 221.86 199.44
July 2007 210.78 260.84 260.39 219.91 198.72
August 2007 208.86 258.07 255.29 216.83 197.37
September 2007 205.28 254.79 249.61 213.47 195.69
October 2007 200.72 249.50 244.35 208.68 192.98
November 2007 194.45 240.43 237.99 201.95 188.94
December 2007 187.67 233.03 231.71 196.05 184.97
January 2008 180.06 224.41 225.40 186.05 180.68
February 2008 172.72 214.83 218.74 177.18 175.96
March 2008 166.97 207.11 208.88 169.31 172.20
April 2008 161.33 202.45 200.42 165.71 169.98
May 2008 157.32 198.54 193.19 161.10 168.60
June 2008 153.19 195.70 189.87 158.80 167.78
July 2008 149.09 192.55 186.84 154.64 166.36
August 2008 144.83 189.18 183.48 150.93 164.64
September 2008 139.79 184.54 178.72 146.86 161.64
October 2008 135.18 179.82 173.42 142.74 158.09
November 2008 130.54 175.85 169.62 138.04 154.50
December 2008 123.93 171.40 165.01 131.40 150.54
January 2009 117.11 166.54 159.04 125.64 146.34
February 2009 111.89 163.16 154.28 121.06 143.11
March 2009 106.83 160.88 148.77 116.44 140.05
April 2009 104.45 159.37 145.78 112.39 139.25
May 2009 103.56 159.18 144.59 109.49 139.98
June 2009 104.73 160.90 145.38 107.31 141.97
July 2009 106.66 163.86 147.27 106.08 144.35
August 2009 108.41 166.52 148.91 105.78 146.16
September 2009 109.26 167.93 149.69 104.82 146.71
October 2009 110.71 168.43 149.09 104.70 146.59
November 2009 111.96 169.72 149.08 104.22 146.25
December 2009 112.53 171.40 148.66 104.39 145.90
Volatility from 0.2451 0.1876 0.1789 0.1853
Dec 2006 to Dec 2009
(based on logarithmic Average: 0.1992
change)
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